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Wither Participatory Banking?: Experiences with Village Banks in South 
Africa  
 
 
Abstract 
Microfinance is widely advocated as a powerful tool to reduce poverty and improve social 
inclusion. How best to achieve these outcomes has been the focus of considerable debate, 
between supporters of minimalist finance-only and services-plus approaches, between the 
merits of client oriented models and member ownership. Many approaches to microfinance 
note the importance of participation within peer groups, the potential for empowerment and 
the support given by civil society organisations. Few studies however have analysed the 
nature and extent of participation, or whether this participation can be understood as 
democratic. In this article we examine four communities in South Africa that belong to a 
Village Bank, an organisation that promotes member ownership and control. The article 
examines members’ experiences of participation, and specifically organisational transparency 
and conflict resolution. We argue that microfinance holds considerable normative and 
symbolic appeal to members but that participation in practice has been limited.  
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Introduction 
In the past two decades advocacy for microfinance has “generated enthusiasm bordering on 
hysteria” with supporters and critics alike pointing to the evangelism of donors, civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and some academics (Mosley and Hulme, 1998: 783). The international 
policy calendar has become choked by microfinance related events, from the World 
Microcredit Summit in 1997, the UN International Year of Microcredit in 2005, the 2006 
award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mohammed Yunus, and activities to demonstrate 
microfinance’s role in the delivery of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UN, 
2005). Multi- and bi- lateral development institutions have increased funding to microfinance 
programmes and banks such as Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and ABN Amro have lent large 
sums. Against what seemed to be a naïve hope in the mid 1990s that microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) would be able to leverage over $US 20 billion in order to reach 100 million of the 
poorest people by 2005, some estimates suggest that these figures have been surpassed (ADL, 
2008; UN, 2005).1 The number of MFIs has increased dramatically to over 3,000 (Robinson, 
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2001) and the World Council of Credit Unions claim almost 50,000 groups with 177 million 
members (WOCCU, 2009).  
 
Although forwarded as a technical exercise in innovative banking practice micro-finance is 
not divorced from the ‘politics of development’, even if it has not been subject to explicit 
scrutiny from a politics perspective. With major international development institutions and 
donors searching for pro-poor interventions with a minimum of state involvement, MFIs were 
able to claim, and with some justification, to reach poor households, to assist the alleviation of 
poverty by reducing vulnerability to cyclical or unexpected crisis, and provide assistance with 
short-term consumption needs (Copestake et al., 2001, Hulme and Mosley, 1996, Matin et al., 
2002 although see Amin et al., 2001, Hulme, 2000). Microfinance’s potential for inverting the 
conventional resource pyramid by bringing the previously considered ‘unbankable’ poor into 
the ‘mainstream’ of financial services has been characterised as “financial democracy” by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (2005) or, through support to micro-enterprises, to what 
USAID refers to as a process of strengthening the “institutions of economic democracy” (see 
Cohen, 2002).  
 
These rather nebulous terms elude to a political economy in which MFIs serve as 
‘intermediaries’ between individuals, communities, other civil society and financial sector 
organisations, and strengthen access to markets. How far this intermediary role should extend 
beyond the confines of banking ‘good practice’ has been the subject of considerable debate 
with some writers advocating a finance-only ‘client knows best’ or institutionalist position, 
that promotes MFI sustainability, and others arguing that provision of services such as 
business training enhances the effectiveness of microfinance and delivery of welfare 
(Morduch, 2000, Robinson, 2001).2 Both views, however, have resonated with a broad church 
 2
 
 
of ideological standpoints towards development, from advocates of business models, 
promoters of less state or more decentralised intervention, and claims for greater roles for 
CSOs, and have been consistent with related conceptual shifts, such as from human to ‘social 
capital’ and women in development to gender empowerment approaches (see Dalgic, 2007, 
Rankin, 2002, Weber, 2002). 
 
Amidst the considerable ‘noise’ surrounding microfinance, there has been little discussion of 
the relationship between or implications for micro-finance of democratic practice and 
participation. Robinson (2001: 40) does note that large-scale sustainable microfinance may 
help create an enabling environment for greater political participation and democracy but the 
point is not followed up. The omission is surprising considering the promotion of MFIs as 
non-state actors, the obviously political nature of the claimed effects in terms of, for example, 
gender empowerment, and institutional claims to practices which include participation and 
transparency, subject to light-touch regulation. In this paper we explore the political 
dimensions of MFIs as intermediaries, and in particular members’ cognisance of concepts 
such as democracy and participation. To do so we look in detail at a member-based 
microfinance organisation in South Africa called Village Banks. Based loosely on the FINCA 
model developed by John Hatch and influenced by the South Africa agrarian co-operative 
movement, Village Banks support membership rather than client-ship, with local oversight 
and democratic practice.3 Our principal interest is to scrutinise to what extent participants 
believed themselves to be ‘owners’ and how far their views held influence over local group 
governance. Rather than consider MFI participation in isolation however we wanted to 
explore the political embeddedness of member involvement, how the Village Bank sat within 
other civil society structures, including local institutions such as traditional authorities. In 
these circumstances how far is it reasonable to expect ‘banking’ to be participatory or 
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democratic, or for microfinance to enhance the ‘space’ for inclusive community structures to 
emerge?  
 
For any society these questions should be important, but are especially so in South Africa 
where CSOs and community based organisations were in the vanguard to resistance against 
apartheid and the layers of exclusion experienced by low-income, black, households (CASE, 
1998, Heinrich, 2001), and where the ‘democratic’ government’s record of poverty alleviation 
and attempts to reduce social and racial inequality has been criticised (Habib and Taylor, 
1999, Niksic, 2004). In Section II we examine the prima facie case for the association 
between civil society, and micro-finance specifically, and more inclusive participation and 
democratic practice. In Section III we outline the importance of MFIs to the provision of 
financial services in South Africa and a brief overview of Village Banks. We then discuss, in 
Sections IV and V, how members of Village Banks assessed its record against a meter of 
participation and conflict resolution. We argue that while members of the Village Banks 
valued the opportunity to participate in their local branch, and held some high ideals for 
governance practice, they understood that practice fell short of expectation. Their comments 
reveal Village Banks to be less member and more client oriented, with daily operations 
circumscribed by the power relations with tribal authorities.  
 
Microfinance, Participation and Democratic Practice 
It is important to position microfinance within debates concerning critical understandings of 
processes such as participation and empowerment. Microfinance has become a key dimension 
of development practice in a context of democratic ‘deepening’ and as CSOs have pressed to 
incorporate ideas of participation into policy (Hadenius and Uggla, 1996). Nevertheless, there 
are calls to reappraise the definitions, discourses and achievements of key terms such as 
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‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ that are according to Cornwall and Brock (2005) “warmly 
persuasive” buzzwords that convey no fixed meaning but rather a facility to communicate a 
sense of conviction and consensus to how development should take place. Despite their 
technocratic resonance, when deconstructed these terms are revealed to be highly ambivalent 
(what they call “fuzz-words”), are sometimes employed to contradictory ends, and which 
block off other ways of expressing problems and solutions (also Kapoor, 2002). Others have 
warned of the dangers of cultural relativism and have argued for more analysis of “actually 
existing civil society” rather than ascribe normative attributes of participation in practice 
(Lewis, 2002, Williams, 2004). As a battery of authors note, CSOs in practice can fall short of 
their own ideals, relying upon bounded rules and disciplined forms of participation with 
limited opportunities for spontaneous dialogue (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Hearn, 2001, 
White, 1999). 
 
An issue of particular concern has been expressed for the ways advocacy for and studies of 
civil society’s participation and empowerment potential invoke ‘the local’ which, as Mohan 
and Stokke (2000) note, is often employed as if co-terminous with ‘community’ and in ways 
that obfuscate power relations. A lack of cognisance to local power structures, notably to 
customary arrangements, and worse if it is assumed that ‘local cultures’ are somehow even-
handed and consensual, threatens ‘elite capture’ and the darker sides of social capital 
(Khwaja, 2004). This critique is salutary for South Africa where there has been considerable 
pressure to incorporate civil society into policy-making and service delivery, as well as 
tensions between the political expediency of enhancing the representation of traditional 
authorities in local politics and a disquiet that ‘resurgent’ traditional institutions will be 
inimical to gender empowerment, the redistribution of wealth and opportunity, and freedom to 
express dissent and extend rights (Beall, 2005, Beall et al., 2005). 
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In these circumstances we need to consider carefully the ‘political’ claims sustained by 
microfinance advocates and research. Here we focus on the two most prevalent claims. The 
first argues that microfinance builds upon mutual solidarity, trust and the reciprocal flows of 
information, enhancing the best features of embedded institutions such as rotating savings and 
credit associations (Bennett et al., 1996, Chiteji, 2002). Researchers have noted, however, 
extension officers expending considerable effort to ‘recruit’ members and maintain group 
membership levels with gifts and rituals such as songs and prayers (Matin et al., 2002, 
Montgomery, 1996, Reinke, 1998). Officers have also been shown to discourage default by 
threatening the confiscation of goods and physical intimidation, or imposing rules to deny 
member access to savings in order to inhibit members from ‘voting with their accounts’ 
(Chiteji, 2002, Montgomery, 1996, Rahman, 1999). A number of authors indicate that even 
when group solidarity appears to be encouraged there is rule-setting to create ‘business like’ 
meetings, and efforts to channel discussion of social and  political issues away from general 
meetings and to dedicated workshops (Fiebig et al., 2002, Montgomery 1996). Despite the 
centrality of solidarity to the microfinance story, it is remarkably unclear how we expect 
participation to be constructed and how we might take account of power relations and 
conflict. 
 
A second claim is that access and use of financial services, and engagement with linked social 
programmes where available, raises opportunities to exercise agency or empowerment within 
household and community decision-making (see Bernasek, 2003, Mahmud, 2003). A version 
of this argument is that group or membership networks may serve as forum for discussion of 
issues from domestic violence, sexual rights, nutrition, independent money management, and 
wider political participation (Goetz and Gupta, 1996, Mayoux, 2001). There is evidence of a 
 6
 
 
transformation of gender roles due to participation in credit programmes, with a reduced 
likelihood that women would be beaten by their partners (Schuler et al., 1996) and greater 
opportunities for groups to gain opportunities for income generation without sanction from 
men, community, religious or caste leaders (Bernasek, 2003). Nevertheless,  the record would 
appear to be mixed. Studies note that women’s participation has been a surrogate for men to 
access finance, that male-on-female violence may increase in situations of ‘stress’ or as 
women challenge patriarchal structures (Bernasek, 2003, Goetz and Gupta, 1996, Mahmud, 
2003, Mayoux, 2001). Despite these concerns, however, relatively little ethnographic work 
has emerged that looks at the discussions taking place within member groups or how the least 
empowered within conventionally excluded groups such as the elderly gain their ‘voice’. 
 
Gaining critical insight into the experience of group solidarity (and liability) and 
empowerment may appear to be moot given that some commentators identify a “second 
revolution” in microfinance whereby the new emphasis is to treat members as ‘clients’ or 
‘customers’ rather than members or ‘owners’ (Fiebig et al.,  2002, Woller, 2002). 
Nevertheless, while a number of high-profile MFIs – notably the Grameen Bank and FINCA - 
have dropped group solidarity/liability from their modus operandi, the vast majority of MFIs 
continue to use a membership structure and/or stress the importance of participation and 
involvement in institutional management. Indeed, even in client oriented institutions, Cohen 
argues that “…nothing can replace the voices of the clients and the importance of ongoing and 
upward flows of information to enable institutions to be more responsive” and “..also brings 
benefits that can improve the bottom line” (2002: 342). This approach is predicated on an 
appraisal of the costs of participation to the MFI that retains a vertical transmission of 
information rather than encourage horizontal and extra-group linkages, or a concern for the 
wider effects of participation or democratic practice on empowerment. But as the ‘second 
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revolution’ encourages membership and participation to wither we should consider how 
members have experienced participation in a situation where it has been encouraged.  
 
Financial Services and the Case Study Communities 
South Africa’s commercial banking sector was set up to serve the country's high-income 
population and corporate sector, but until the early part of this decade left nearly 60% of the 
population and especially the black African population ‘unbanked’ (Nigrini, 2001, Paulson 
and McAndrews, 1998). The reasons for this market and institutional failure have been the 
subject of repeated regulatory reforms, establishment of public wholesale finance institutions 
and introduction of ATM technologies to encourage banks to go ‘downmarket’ (Kirsten, 
2006, Paulson and McAndrews, 1998). In 2008 close to 38% of households remained 
‘unbanked’ with services especially deficient for the poor, non asset holders and those living 
on tribal lands (Finmark, 2008, Kirsten, 2006). Without access to financial services there are 
few methods of keeping cash secure. One woman in a case study community stated that her 
mother used to put money in a tin can which would be flattened and hidden under a rock, and 
another woman described how people would wrap their money in an old cloth that would then 
be stitched inside clothing, “like an old cloth inside her body”. Many respondents mentioned 
that these methods would lead to the money being damaged, found and spent by children, 
forgotten about or stolen. It is hardly surprising that respondents to a Participatory Poverty 
Assessment identified access to financial services as vital to their ability to deal with poverty 
and cover consumption shortfalls without recourse to moneylenders or intra family borrowing 
(Van de Ruit et al., 2001). As anyone who has witnessed a ‘pension day’ will attest, the 
difficulty of saving in secure forms encourages immediate consumption.4  
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MFIs have set up in unserved areas but most people use a range of embedded ‘informal’ or 
semi-formal financial organisations. Perhaps the best known is the stokvel (also known as 
gooi gooi, mogadisano or umgalelo) which operates as a rotating savings scheme through 
regular payments over a given cycle from which members can either make withdrawals on 
demand, usually subject to group approval, or by an agreed rotation. Many variations of 
stokvels exist, including as burial societies, to accumulate lobola (marriage wealth) or to draw 
down remittance incomes from migrants working away (Nigrini, 2001). The National 
Stokvels Association (NSASA) calculates about eight million South Africans are stokvel 
members making contributions of R1 billion per month. Alarmingly, the newspapers regularly 
report on stokvels collapsing. The alternative to a stokvel is a credit union, locally managed 
organisations capitalised by members holding shares and paying a user fee to make or 
withdraw deposits. Unlike the stokvel, unions do not require members to meet on a regular 
basis and there is no rotation component. Members may organise independently to apply for 
group credit, but loans are not made on the basis of group solidarity and supervision is usually 
limited to oversight of accounts by, for example, the Savings and Credit Cooperative League 
(SACCOL) (see Schoeman et al., 2003). 
 
Our research looked at a hybrid credit union called Village Financial Services Co-operative, 
known as Village Banks. As the name suggests Village Bank emerged from the co-operative 
movement but was formally established in 1994 in North West Province with financial 
support from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the 
Department of Agriculture, and regulated by The Financial Services Association (FSA) that 
was also charged with providing staff training and to develop new financial products (IFAD, 
1997, Schoeman et al., 2003).5 The Village Bank concept aimed to encourage poor people to 
save either individually or as a stokvel, with the branch depositing funds at a ‘link bank’ to 
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ensure against theft and to provide an audit trail. Member funds would be accessible on 
demand by individual account holders although for larger sums, in the case of a burial society 
for example, a few days notice would be required. The fees for deposits and withdrawals were 
expected to cover the salary of a day-to-day administrator (IFAD, 1997). The FSA received 
funding from the Department of Welfare to expand operations, and by 2002 there were 62 
branches with R80 billion deposits and perhaps as many as 80,000 members. When further 
funding for the FSA was denied, prompting the Association to collapse in 2004, Village 
Banks were left to operate independently.6
 
In principle, the governance of Village Banks was to be democratic and participatory, with the 
branches owned and managed by their members who would be shareholders: each branch 
would be capitalised by the purchase of one share per member (costing R10 at time of field 
research) with no gate keeping to determine ‘ownership’ according to income, job or gender 
for example. Shareholding qualified each person with the right to vote for a board of 
management that would be responsible for the recruitment of an administrator, determine the 
balance between cash and deposits, approve loans, set fees, and compile the annual accounts 
(Nigrini, 2001). The boards are subject to the scrutiny of the shareholders through an annual 
general meeting and extraordinary meetings where called by a quorum of shareholders (IFAD, 
1997). The original idea was to build upon local institutions and support solidarity within the 
community, and to respond to beneficiary needs in a transparent manner (IFAD, 1997). As 
such, Village Banks aimed to ensure that members ‘own’ their branch and participate in its 
management, thereby promoting democratic practice internally as well as a broader sense of 
empowerment. In a context in which most South Africans are reported not to trust ‘informal’ 
savings and lending groups (Porteous, 2005), the oversight offered by Bank membership, 
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participation in Board selection, decision-making and account approval should be important 
both to bank function and member financial security. 
 
Fieldwork to assess the democratic and participatory record of Village Bank was conducted in 
four communities in order to capture a diversity of social, political and cultural contexts. The 
four communities were selected taking into account demographic profile, length of Village 
Bank operations and services offered. At the time of fieldwork, Village Banks were located 
principally in KwaZulu-Natal (seven branches), North West, Mpumalanga and Eastern Cape 
(six branches each), with two branches in Limpopo. Most branches were located in areas that 
ranked among the poorest nationally either by measures of income-expenditure or 
vulnerability attributes (May, 1998). In KwaZulu-Natal we selected Bhambanana, located 22 
kilometres from Ingwavuma and 38 kilometres from the regional hub of Jozini both of which 
possessed branches of Ithala, a provincial development bank. Bhambanana had a petrol 
station, two Cash & Carry’s, two liquor stores, one supermarket, one café, and a fruit and 
vegetable market. The Bhambanana Village Bank opened in June 2000 and there were 3,060 
members drawn from a 25-50 kilometre radius. The branch offered savings accounts, fixed 
deposits and a funeral scheme, which was only being utilised by 15 people, and they had just 
started offering loans to small businesses. The branch had approximately R290,900 in 
deposits held at First National Bank, and charged of R1 for every R100 deposited, R2 for 
withdrawals less than R100 and R1 per additional R100. 
 
The second site was Motswedi situated in the North West province near the border with 
Botswana and 35 kilometres from Zeerust. The branch was opened in 1996 and during 
fieldwork had 1,451 account holders, accessing savings, fixed deposits and funeral scheme 
benefits. State old age pensions and disability grants were also paid directly into the accounts 
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which held approximately R1.8 million. Motswedi was referred to by the FSA as a “success” 
because of its level of accumulated deposits. The third community was Sakaletfu, located in 
eastern Mpumalanga close to Malelane (25km), and consisted of a number of densely 
populated townships. The Sakaletfu Village Bank started in 1999 and had 515 account 
holders. Eligible account holders were able to have pension and disability payments 
transferred directly into accounts, and the branch had begun to provide loans (36 people had 
loans up to R200 repayable over four months). Finally, Mathabatha situated in Limpopo near 
to Lebowakgomo township and 80 kilometres from Polokwane was chosen. The Village Bank 
was formed after one of the board members heard of the concept at a meeting in Kgautswane 
and the community supported her idea, officially opening a branch in May 2000. Mathabatha 
Village Bank had 279 account holders. No charges were made on deposits but a R3 charge 
was levied on withdrawals between R10-500 and R6 on withdrawals over R500. The Bank 
had deposits worth approximately R47,000. 
 
In each of the communities focus groups were organised with separate groups for men and 
women, and with participants of different ages, educational attainment and vocational status. 
A third focus group was held with the board members, in order that branch members would 
not feel intimidated to speak at their meeting, and a fourth focus group was organised with 
pensioners.7 Focus groups were prompted to discuss the meaning of democracy in general 
terms before moving on to discuss how participants understood the rules and constitution of 
Village Bank, how they engaged with the branch on a day to day basis and through more 
formal decision making. The research did not attempt to suggest a particular definition of 
democracy or participation, and nor did we expect that experience of Village Banks would 
meet the wishes of all members or that everyone would have the same relationship with the 
branch. Conversations were encouraged about how the Village Bank compared to other 
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organisations within the community in the expectation that participants might recognise the 
branch as being owned and managed by its members. A broad set of questions were asked 
about people influential within the local branch, the election of board members and feedback 
on how the board made decisions. We wanted the focus groups to discuss how or if Village 
Banks provided an opportunity for members to express their wishes and concerns among 
themselves or to the board, for diverse and even contradictory social interests to be expressed, 
and if consensus was reached for these views to be acted upon. We were interested as much 
by the range of opinion and how ideas of bank operation were expressed as whether views 
were unanimously held. 
 
The Experience of Participation 
Not surprisingly, on the subject of democracy responses varied widely across the groups. 
People from at least one group in each community made reference to broader concepts such as 
equality, freedom of expression, freedom of rights and freedom from oppression. Some went 
so far as to assimilate the concept of democracy to freedom itself and one pensioner from 
Mathabatha stated that “Democracy is Unity” - a relatively non-specific synonym in the South 
Africa context lifted from political slogans. Others referred to relationships within their own 
community. The Motswedi Men’s group commented, 
 
I think democracy means the system at which government is transparent in this 
community, including the freedom of speech, including transparency at which they 
respond to the community in time. 
 
Some made direct reference from general discussion to the Village Bank without being 
prompted. A common sentiment was that the whole community was involved in the 
establishment of the Village Bank, therefore it was democratic, and because the branch 
allowed anyone to join without needing a job. 
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It is important because I am able to open a bank account for my child, I do not have a 
formal job or a payslip but that did not stop me from opening a bank account at the 
Village Bank. The Village Bank does not have rules that stop me from opening a bank 
account. The other banks have rules that prohibit people who do not have payslips from 
opening accounts with them; here anyone could open an account at anytime. 
(Mathabatha Women) 
 
There were some signs that groups were aware that inclusivity was a challenge to the status 
quo. Describing non members as richer households who wanted ATMs and regarded a Village 
Bank as beneath them one group stated: 
 
They have no confidence in us. They want to see us working with the computer. They 
don't trust us with our pencils and paper, they say their money is not safe. (Bhambanana 
Board) 
 
Residents from Mathabatha seemed most vocal and confident in their understanding of 
democracy and how it applied to their lives, with some groups drawing detailed links between 
the transparency and accountability of the Bank and democratic principle. 
 
In the light of the Village Bank, it is a concept that was developed by the people for 
themselves. They have full access to all information regarding the bank; they have the 
right to demand the financial statement of the bank at any time without fear. It is much 
easier to address a person that you know on a personal level. If at the end of the day a 
person feels a sense of ownership as well as belonging and is comfortable with the set 
up, that to me describes democracy. (Mathabatha Board, emphasis added) 
 
 
The diversity of this general discussion already revealed tensions that would be more evident 
later. In Motswedi, for example, the board members offered a limited interpretation of 
democracy “as freedom”, whereas participants of the male and female focus groups gave 
detailed and personal descriptions of the concept. 
 
Responses to the meaning of participation followed a similar pattern. Members from 
Bhambanana stated that participation meant ‘being involved’, to work together and to get 
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along with people. Members of the board from Mathabatha discussed how various clubs, 
associations and surrounding communities were using the branch. The board members from 
Sakaletfu discussed participation in terms of “making a contribution” whilst the women’s 
group said that it involved co-operation with other people. Similar themes emerged from 
Motswedi, where mention was made of working together and taking part in community 
development.  
 
I think participation deals with, amongst other things, transparency. I mean if the 
management of the community is not more transparent to this community I do not think 
the community will speak more into what they decide. So I think if there is 
transparency, there is also participation. (Motswedi Men) 
 
Yet when prompted to discuss the relationship between the shareholders and board members, 
and who made decisions and how, some focus groups became confused, a precursor to what 
was later to be revealed as an uneven picture of participation and inclusivity. Most groups 
were able to recognise the role of board members and offered some indication, seemingly 
more an aspiration, that the shareholders ultimately took decisions:  
 
It gives me power to put forward my suggestions and if I get support from fellow 
shareholders it would mean we could implement them. (Bhambanana Men) 
 
It gives me the right to ask questions if I am dissatisfied about something. (Bhambanana 
Women) 
 
In the case of Mathabatha, the board members and women’s focus group seemed to concur. 
The decisions are announced through the Chairperson but in any association there is a 
protocol and policies as well as administrative matters. In terms of administrative 
matters the Bank Manager sees to that.. When it comes to the policies of the bank, the 
shareholders are the main decision-makers. We as the Board Directors, we act on what 
the shareholders want, the decision making process is not centred on certain individuals. 
It comes from the ground until it gets to the administration and the chairperson. 
(Mathabatha Board) 
 
In other instances considerable disagreement was expressed. The women’s group at Motswedi 
for example discussed a deep-seated unhappiness with the board,  
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The Village Bank operates properly, but we have a problem with the board. Normally 
these people in the board don’t consult the community members, they are the ones who 
decide what to do about the Village Bank who should do this and who should be doing 
this. (Motswedi Women) 
 
The board members recognised that some decisions might require community input but that 
they have the authority to make decisions.  
 
Discussion of Village Bank governance revealed an ambivalent picture. Each branch was 
supposed to have an agreed constitution which one group related directly to a sense of 
ownership:  
We have our own constitution, which is different from their constitution [commercial 
banks]. The other banks don’t meet up with their clients to solve the problems. The 
members know everything about the bank. We want to see this bank develop. (Sakaletfu 
Men) 
 
As might be expected, board members gave more detailed responses and were able to identify 
something equivalent to a constitution. Board members from Mathabatha stated that their 
constitution was similar to that recommended by the FSA, whilst the Bhambanana and 
Sakaletfu boards mentioned that the constitution described the different responsibilities of the 
board members. The board members from Motswedi however discussed a range of rules that 
they claim were written down but not discussed with members. These rules spoke to the 
exertion of board control over the communities, preventing members from forming new 
branches for example. Yet, most focus groups were unaware of any constitution, interpreting 
‘rules’ as referring simply to opening and closing times, the use of an ID book and the 
different fees levels. The men from Motswedi and the pensioners from Bhambanana both 
emphatically stated that there was no constitution whilst the men from Bhambanana and the 
pensioners in Sakaletfu said there was one but they knew nothing about it.  
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Further discrepancy emerged to challenge the claimed ‘membership’, and corresponding 
accountability, of Village Bank. It was revealed that not all account holders were shareholders 
and vice versa. Thus, for example, the Sakaletfu Board commented: 
 
It’s very important to have the Village Bank. People have something that they can 
identify as their own thing. This bank has an intention to develop this community. The 
other banks, like Standard Bank serves the interest of the White people. The community 
is empowered and they appreciate that they own the Village Bank. (Sakaletfu Board)  
 
Such an ethos might explain why Sakaletfu Village Bank had 515 account holders but 580 
shareholders. By contrast, in Motswedi there were only 237 shareholders compared with 
1,451 account holders and in Mathabatha there were 279 account holders but 216 
shareholders.8 Some of the focus groups commented on their confusion as to the distinction 
between accounts and shares. 
 
Since I am not educated, when I went to open an account I was just told that I should 
also buy shares as well and I did. But I did not understand what it meant. I did not even 
think about asking. (Mathabatha Women) 
 
The Village Bank model stipulates that account holders own a share, and may hold more 
without gaining additional voting rights or obligations. Hence it is possible for there to be 
more shares than accounts but not more shareholders and not more accounts than shares. 
Extending availability of accounts without the requirement of shareholding might be 
interpreted as a sensitive response to the limited income of potential members – participants 
of the Sakaletfu women’s focus group had mentioned a lack of income as one reason why 
some did not have shares - and a desire to raise account numbers. However, the experience of 
Motswedi indicates a less generous explanation. The men’s focus group revealed that the 
board had stopped the purchase of shares a number of years ago. As this discussion went on 
members of both the men and women’s focus groups began to change their comments 
regarding the ‘democratic’ nature of the Village Bank. The men in particular now felt strongly 
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that the board was running the branch and criticised the control exerted by elders closely 
linked to the traditional authority. In reappraising some of their earlier views they argued that: 
 
I think democracy in the village is a controlled one because we are not exercising some 
of our rights, most of the people who are here, all the decisions are taken by the tribal 
people. (Motswedi Men) 
 
The elders of the village are the ones who elect the board. After they have been elected 
they are told to lead us. …We are oppressed by the members of the board, they don’t 
give us the right to say anything. That is wrong and it is unfair. (Motswedi Women) 
 
The board defended the decision but confirmed the suspicion that controlling membership 
was functional to wider political interests. 
Initially when we started, we only allowed people who resided in Motswedi to buy 
shares. But we came to a point where we decided to spread our services to the 
neighbouring villages, since there were a lot of demands from them and they wanted to 
become members of the Village Bank. It was then up to the board to decide whether or 
not we should sell shares to members of the neighbouring villages as they will be 
standing a chance of being elected as members of the board of directors. Then the board 
decided that we can’t sell shares to the people from neighbouring villages, we rather sell 
to the people who reside in Motswedi, in case [of] problems. When you have shares, 
you can be a member for a period of 12 months unless the board rules you out on certain 
conditions that will be known to that particular client and the board, so they could stand 
a chance of being elected. We don’t want to be governed by somebody from outside. 
(Motswedi Board) 
 
In this particular case governance was determined by relations with the embedded institutions 
of the tribal authority and their perceived need for autonomy. 
 
With question-marks hanging over the governance of Village Banks it was important to 
consider if people felt their opinions were heard and taken into account by boards. In all 
cases, however, it was clear that few meetings ever took place. In Mathabatha, and to a lesser 
extent in Sakaletfu, there had been meetings and confidence was expressed that opinions were 
heard and acted upon. The Sakaletfu men’s group noted that meetings involved discussion, 
with the floor open to whomsoever wished to contribute. But when asked about what kinds of 
issues came up for discussion few concrete examples were offered. Indeed, the unevenness of 
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the record casts doubts on the quality of participation. Pensioners in Bhambanana for example 
claimed to have no knowledge of who formed the board, the protocols for meetings, or could 
confirm if there had been meetings. Instead of meetings the branch administrator was 
identified as the principal channel of information between board and members. In Mathabatha 
the administrator had taken it upon herself to produce a quarterly statement that was given 
verbally to shareholders due to a shortage of paper and widespread illiteracy. Account holders 
seemed to appreciate the effort the form this information sharing took: 
There is respect from the employees in the Village Bank whereas in other Banks there is 
no sense of respect where they do not use the language that I would understand. 
Sometimes they call us "Grandmother" and "Aunty", it’s an insult. (Bhambanana 
Women) 
 
The sense of ownership through participation therefore is related to social relations with the 
administrator rather more than a conscious effort to promote shareholding and dialogue. 
 
Branches in two communities stand out as operating according to more democratic and 
participatory principles. In Sakaletfu the board had held its second elections in February 2002 
and at the same time presented a financial year-end report. About half of the shareholders had 
attended the meeting and a vote took place via nominations and a show of hands. The 
previous elections had been in 2000, with no election in 2001 because the chairman had 
avoided calling one. When it was revealed that the chair had borrowed money without 
permission from the branch the board was pressured to hold elections, which removed the 
chairman from office, an event that raised awareness among the board members of their 
responsibilities to hold elections. Moreover, since the removal of the chairman, it was claimed 
that there had been a growth of interest in the branch and the new board was actively 
encouraging the purchase of shares, including as a form of investment. A similar picture 
emerged in Mathabatha that had also experienced its second election in January 2002. 
According to the board, the election was attended by shareholders who had voted via a show 
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of hands and this had brought some changes to board membership. Current board members 
felt that people would not re-elect those who had under performed.  
 
Although the experience of Sakaletfu and Mathabatha might be considered participation 
redux, an even more cautionary insight is offered by the other two communities. The 
Motswedi branch had not held an election since the board was established in 1996 because, as 
a board member explained, while the original intention had been to limit service to one year it 
was felt that board members were learning how to do their job and branch stability was 
paramount. Yet, descriptions of the only election to have been held in Motswedi from two of 
the focus groups argued that no vote to elect the board had taken place and the board had 
appointed itself based on members’ position in the traditional authority. Subsequent to this 
‘election’, the men and women’s groups said no shareholder meetings had ever taken place 
although intriguingly the pensioners stated that shareholder meetings did take place.  
 
The chiefs (Amakhosi) were also instrumental in the formation of the board in Bhambanana. It 
transpired that the board was constituted in May 2000 at a meeting which, according to board 
members, was called by the Department of Social Welfare, the FSA and the chiefs. At the 
meeting, the purpose of the Village Bank was explained by the representatives of the 
Department of Social Welfare and the FSA, and those attending were requested to elect the 
board. Members then pointed out various people, stating that they wanted certain people on 
the board and, apparently, agreeing that the board should include representatives from each of 
the four traditional authorities.9 Retrospective accounts of participation at this meeting were 
divided. The women’s group mentioned that they participated in the election process, but the 
men’s group made no mention of it, and the pensioners stated that they were not present and 
seemed indifferent. No subsequent election has taken place, no annual shareholder meetings 
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have been held and no dividends have been paid. The continued control of the tribal authority 
in Bhambanana and Motswedi was reflected in the gender and age composition of the boards 
which were all male in the case of Motswedi, where most of the board members were over the 
age of 70, with the eldest being 82, or possessed only one female member (the administrator) 
in Bhambanana. Sakaletfu had two women on the board and Mathabatha had five women on 
the boards including the chairperson.  
 
Conflict Resolution, Traditional Authority and Autonomy 
A reasonable test of actually existing participation is how an organisation resolves conflicts. 
Ideally, there should be procedures in place and widely known about to deal with conflict or 
misconduct in a timely, fair and transparent manner. When asked, however, participants were 
unable to identify a procedure that should be followed should a conflict arise with only the 
Mathabatha women’s focus group describing a series of warnings from the board to a possible 
wrongdoer. In Bhambanana, the board members opined that concerns would be raised first 
with the administrator who in turn would notify the board if s/he could not resolve the issue. 
The obvious difficulty here is that the absence of shareholder meetings makes sanctions 
emanating from the board unaccountable. Hence, in all four case studies we learned that 
‘discipline’ depended upon the status of board members with the traditional authorities. In 
Motswedi the board claimed that disputes would be taken to the chief who had attended the 
first meeting of the members to indicate that the bank would “run smoothly”. Similarly, 
pensioners in Mathabatha believed that the chief would be called in to deal with conflict and 
in Sakaletfu it was suggested that the board resolved problems but the Izinduna (headmen) 
would attend such a meeting. 
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The symbolic and coercive power of the tribal authority might provide legitimacy to forms of 
dispute resolution in the absence of more participatory methods of branch governance 
generally. From the example of disputes, however, such a view appears optimistic. In 
Mathabatha, participants expressed dissatisfaction that they had not been informed when the 
bank had been robbed and blamed the board for the lax security. The response of the board 
indicated a concern with textbook procedure. 
Normally, if it is a security problem, the person in charge of security would inform the 
Chairperson of the Board and the Chairperson would pass the information onto the 
board where it will be discussed. But if it were a security issue, we would have to take 
measures that would reach the shareholders regarding what happened. In the case of a 
robbery for instance, after the Head of Security informed me, I am the Chairperson, I 
told the Board of Directors and we discussed the issue and opened a case. We then 
reported it to the shareholders where we gave them a report of the incident. We are 
responsible and accountable to them, so we must take initiatives to their advantage. 
(Mathabatha Board)  
 
But the comments from the other focus groups suggest this procedure had been followed, or 
not quickly enough, and despite the apparent reassurance of ‘correct’ practice implicit in the 
quote the reference to “Normally” hardly inspires confidence.  
 
We have already noted how boards and tribal authorities maintained close, occasionally 
almost indistinguishable, relations. In the case of Motswedi one effect had been the exclusion 
of people from outside the immediate village from the purchase of shares and both women 
and men’s focus groups claimed a degree of ‘capture’ by older members in how the bank was 
run. As one group put it: 
 
I think they are the rich people because most of [them] are pensioners. You see that is 
my worry that what I say will last. We’ve got to change this board because they are all 
pensioners, they are earning money every month and they don’t worry about the 
progress, they don’t even know that the money we save, we save it to develop 
something but not to save the money to be proud that we have money. [In] my view the 
money that the bank is making it is made so that it should develop the youngsters, it 
should not be collected to be a lump sum of money that has got no use. (Motswedi Men) 
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In both Motswedi and Bhambanana views were expressed that the banks beholden to football 
clubs and burial societies that held deposits with the branch. 
Because they [Burial Societies] are taking their income to save here and they withdraw 
at the time when they need the money. That is how they influence the Village Bank. 
(Motswedi Men) 
 
In Mathabatha by contrast, the traditional authority appeared to have less influence: 
He [the chief] does not have the power to control how the bank should be managed. His 
responsibility is to see that the community and the Village Bank have a good working 
relationship as well as to ensure that the community is satisfied with the Village Bank. 
If he were to realise that the two parties were not working well together, then he would 
intervene. (Mathabatha Women) 
 
In Sakaletfu and Mathabatha it was stated that the bank held its autonomy from local 
institutions, whereas in Motswedi and Bhambanana the embeddedness of the branches within 
local institutions appeared to be a simmering dispute that undermined claims to ownership 
and participation.10  
 
Conclusions 
Although occasionally referred to as a ‘movement’ microfinance is not usually included in 
either celebratory or critical accounts of civil society. The sense is that MFIs are not 
politically progressive and despite claims to empower and in some cases operate in 
participatory ways, microfinance institutions’ convenience or complicity to the neoliberal 
agenda suggests an inherent conservative ethos. Yet, MFIs represent important agents in civil 
society, possess rapidly growing numbers of members or clients, and are able to mobilise 
significant resources. Moreover MFIs exist within, and indeed rely upon, other ‘local’ 
embedded institutions and may be networked to private commercial banks nationally and 
internationally, multi- and bi-lateral donors, church groups, trade unions and co-operative 
movements, as well as government agencies while being ‘non-state actors’. Conspicuous by 
its absence in the research on civil society, there has been similarly little attention afforded to 
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investigating the quality of participation from researchers principally interested in 
microfinance. 
 
While Village Banks does not profess to follow the peer group methodology associated with 
many MFIs, and nor does it burden members with regular meetings or ‘bonding’ exercises, it 
does claim to be owned by its members and to be democratically organised. Village Banks is 
normatively client led through shareholding, information exchange and the regular election of 
board members. Our research looked at how far these procedures had meaning to Bank 
members. The focus groups articulated ambitious understandings of what democracy meant, 
including notions of freedom, equality and unity, and some, if few, links between these 
concepts and the specific ‘belonging’ to or working of Village Bank were drawn. Specifically, 
members felt that the Bank was democratic because the community had participated in its 
inception although this was not actually true. However, participants rarely described 
themselves as owners and some claimed that the focus groups were the first occasion they had 
reflected upon their relationship with the branch. The principal reason why ‘ownership’ was 
not more strongly felt appears linked to the uneasy relationship between board members and 
the rights of shareholders. This was evident in Motswedi where a number of account holders 
did not know that they were entitled to shares. In this instance, the board members had altered 
the rules to protect their interests which involved the deferment of decision-making to the 
traditional authority, although this was a feature of all four communities to some extent.  
 
Does this mixed record of participation and transparency matter? At one level democratic 
structures within an MFI should make little difference to the delivery of financial services and 
seeking the opinions of members at every turn would impose transaction and opportunity 
costs which will be most keenly felt by the poorest. It is revealing perhaps that Motswedi has 
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the most impressive savings record despite not having held a board election since its inception 
in 1996. Nevertheless as the best capitalised of the four banks, with substantial funds held at 
the ‘link bank’ earning interest all ‘members’ as shareholders should receive a useful 
dividend. So far as we could establish no dividend had ever been paid, effectively meaning 
that the deposits of poor savers were funding the operation of the branch when funds might 
have been better used. Of course, were a dividend to be paid the decision of the board to deny 
shareholding to non Motswedi residents would have had a punitive material distributive 
outcome. 
 
While people in the four communities therefore placed value in ‘democratic banking’ as a 
normative ideal the record of MFI governance suggests significant failings in participation 
and quality of oversight. At best, as expressed in the focus groups, the daily engagement with 
an MFI such as Village Banks presented members with a low quality ‘political space’. In part 
we can explain this condition in terms of the embeddedness of the banks in the power 
relations determined by the tribal authority, and with consequent effects in terms of deferment 
to age and gender in decision making. Bank governance was not fundamentally autonomous 
from local institutions, it rather reflected them. This leads to the paradoxical situation in 
which the poorest people in our villages were women and those men who had not moved 
away for work, the better off were older men and pensioners more generally. While all were 
potentially ‘unbanked’ their inclusion into a membership oriented organisation was unequal, 
with the poorest given the least voice in how their resources should be managed. This 
inequality of outcome was not a matter of design but it was a feature of how Village Bank 
design was operationalised, with the FSA overseeing the initial formation of the banks in 
close cooperation with the tribal authorities, and its subsequent inability to regulate 
operations. 
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Finally, if the experience of the banks is at all generalisable to other cooperative or 
membership styled organisations then the identified shift from membership to clientship as 
announced by the so-called “second revolution” may capture the intentions of donors and 
large umbrella MFIs but is less adequate as a means to appreciate what is happening in 
‘actually existing civil society’. In practice members of Village Banks seem to have been 
treated as clients, and not terribly valued ones at that, almost from the outset. The discussion 
in the focus groups, and additional conversations with administrators, revealed pride at the 
achievement of establishing a banking organisation, at maintaining savings deposits and 
support for the relative security and accessibility that the Village Bank offers poor 
households. For now, peoples’ experience of participation however suggests that catchy terms 
such as ‘financial democracy’ should be considered open metaphors rather than accurate 
labels of microfinance’s political dimensions. 
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Endnotes 
1 One estimate puts the demand for microfinance at approximately $US 250 billion with 
outstanding loans worth around $US 25 billion (ADL, 2008). 
 
2 Microfinance has been associated with improvements to literacy and malnutrition, and as a 
tool to extend HIV-AIDS awareness and to ease the financial burden of those infected 
(Kirsten, 2006, McDonagh, 2001). 
 
3 According to John Hatch “Village banks are highly democratic, self-managed, grassroots 
organizations. They elect their own leaders, select their own members, create their own 
bylaws, do their own bookkeeping, manage all funds, disburse and deposit all funds, resolve 
loan delinquency problems, and  levy their own fines on members who come late, miss 
meetings, or fall behind in their payments” (Hatch, 2004). 
 
4 Means-tested pensions are received by over 80% of age-qualifying African households who 
receive a sum equivalent to about 50% of average household income. On pension days people 
wait for hours for the truck with an ATM machine welded to the back and armed guards. 
Even before funds are distributed sites become itinerant markets mostly selling clothes, 
domestic goods and food. 
 
5 A separate support system for Village Banks was provided by FINASOL, established by the 
South African Sugar Association’s Financial Aid Fund, and which operated a franchise 
arrangement in which FINASOL took a stake in the branch (Schoeman et al., 2003). 
 
6 Personal communication, David de Jong, FSA Regulator, South African Microfinance Apex 
Fund, Department for Trade and Industry, Government of the Republic of South Africa, 10 
March 2009. Almost simultaneously FINASOL also collapsed. 
 
7 Groups were facilitated by field staff of Development Research Africa, a private research 
consultancy, with meetings conducted in local languages.  
 
8 There may be a different but equally alarming discrepancy in play in Bhambanana where a 
survey conducted by Dallimore in 2002 could only locate 85 account holders within five 
kilometres of the town when the bank claimed over 3,000 members. Although attrition in all 
four banks was significant the more likely explanation is the bank had encouraged set up of 
‘ghost accounts’.  
 
9 It was argued that the high number of members in Bhambanana was partly because the 
Inkosi (traditional leader) had instructed everyone to buy shares. 
 
10 The sense of greater autonomy from the chief in Mathabatha seems largely contextual as he 
was described as a drunk and lacked credibility generally. The claimed involvement of the 
chief in event of dispute seemed more likely here to deference to the office than to the holder.  
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